In the past years, statesmen have been concerned about the means of enthroning peace in a seemingly anarchical world.
This concern can be understood more within the realization that there has never really been an identifiable institution in the world with an over whelming authority, power and ability to control the behaviour of states in the international system.It is this situation that has made states interested in peace to devise various ways and means of maintaining peace in the world. One of these means has been through the concept of balance of power. This is why Goldstein and Pevehouse (2009), say that "in the anarchy of the system, the most reliable brake on the power of one state is the power of other states" (p.51). In emphasizing the anarchical system and the utility of the concept of balance of power, Herz (1993), argues that:
Traditionally, the classical systems of international relations, or the modern state system, has been considered 'anarchic,' because it was based on unequally distributed power and was deficient in higher-that is supra-natural-authority- Its units, the independent, sovereign nation- states, were forever threatened by stronger power and survived precariously through the balance-of- power system (p.204).
Meaning of Balance of Power
Though balance of power is still the central theoretical concept in international relations, (Synder, in Palmer & Perkins 1985), it still lacks a generally accepted meaning. Thus, Haas, (1953), has identified eight distinct meanings and four uses of the concept. They are:
Balance meaning Distribution of Power;
Balance meaning Equilibrium;
Balance meaning Hegemony;
Balance meaning Stability and peace;
Balance meaning Instability and war;
Balance meaning Power Politics;
Balance meaning A universal law of history; and Balance as a system and guide to policy making.
The uses are:
Balance of power as description
Balance of power as propaganda and ideology
Balance of power as an analytical concept; and balance of power as prescription.
In his seminal work, 'Politics Among Nations' Haris Morgenthau (1966), opined that he would use the term in four different senses. They are; (1) as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs,
(2) as an actual state of affairs,
(3) as an approximately equal distribution of power
(4) as any distribution of power.
Though he added that; wherever the term is used without qualification, it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality. In his own classification, Andersen (2018), states that the balance of power has been used in multiple ways with different meanings. For example:
It could simply be a definition of how international politics stands at a specific moment, meaning the current distribution of power- the status quo-whether it is in balance or not. For example, one could talk about "the balance of power in Europe" at a particular point in time. It can also be a policy prescription, something successful policy makers should pursue. The balance of power can be an ideology, just like any other political view. Or be used as propaganda to sway a public opinion in one way or the other policy direction.
In terms of definitions, Palmer & Perkins (1985) have listed some as enunciated by notable scholars. We take a look at them. Pollard (1923) states that the essential idea of balance of power is equilibrium of the type represented by a pair of scales. When the weights in a scale are equal, balance results. In terms of states, the concept assumes that through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures, no one power or combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong as to threaten the security of the rest. Ispitilog laubivibni to boc Schwarzenberger (1951) sees it as "equilibrium or a certain amount of stability in international relations that under favourable conditions is produced by an alliance of states or by other devices". To Fay (1937), it means such a just equilibrium in power among the members of the family of nations as will prevent anyone of them from becoming sufficiently strong to force its will upon the others. Pollard (1923), says that the concept of balance of power may mean anything; and it is used not only in different senses by different people, or in different senses by the same people at different times, but in different senses by the same person at the same time.
It is seen by Britannica (n.d.) as "the posture and policy of a nation or group of nations protecting itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power against the power of the other side". It argues that:
States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as when embarking upon a policy of alliances.
Still on the concept, Morgenthau (1966) sees it as "only a particular while Dickson manifestation of a general social principle", distinguished between two uses of the term as "an equality as of the two sides when an account is balanced, and on the other hand, an inequality as when one has a balance to one's credit at the bank". To him, while the concept professes the former, it pursues the latter. It was the above reasoning that made Morgenthau (1966) to argue that:
All nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance that is equality of power but as a superiority of power on their own behalf. And since no nation has foreseen how large its miscalculation will turn out to be, all nations must ultimately seek the maximum of power obtainable under the circumstances. vdHosti (1995), gives what can be seen as a working definition of the concept. To him:
It proposes that states will form coalitions and counter coalitions to fend off drives for regional or global domination and that a "balancer" will intervene on behalf of the weaker side in order to redress the balance or restore the old equilibrium. The behaviour of individual political units is thus explained in terms of the state of the whole system (balanced or imbalanced) and the presence or absence of one aggressive state and a balancer.
Goldstein and Pevehouse (2009), state that it refers to the general concept of one or more states power being used to balance that of another state or group of states. It can also refer to any ratio of power capabilities between states or alliances, or it can mean only a relatively equal ratio, while alternatively it can refer to the process by which counterbalancing coalitions have repeatedly formed in history to prevent one state from conquering an entire region.
Origin of the Concept of Balance of Power et mont
Andersen (2018), posits that the balance of power is historically one of the most important concepts in international politics and the academic discipline of international relations.
He cites Brooks and Wohlforth (2008), who opined that"no single proposition about international politics has attracted more scholarly effort than the balance of power. It is perhaps as central in today's thinking as it has been at any time since the Enlightenment". He argues that some scholars have claimed that the idea of the balance of power existed among the ancient Greeks, in the Anthenian Historian Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian war from 431 BC. Though Thucydides did not write about the balance of power, but some argue that there might have been a balance-of-power thinking without the exact phrase being used.
What is established is that David Hume had argued in 1742 that the principle of balance of power "is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity"; it had naturally discovered itself in foreign politics" (cited in Andersen 2018). Andersen, states that Hume being the first to draw the line so far in time, constructed an age-old tradition of the balance of power against those seeking to question its existence. Thus the balance had been occasionally mentioned throughout the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries as a metaphor to describe a political situation. The Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 is considered the inauguration of the golden age of the balance of power.
Britinnaca (n.d.), traces the origin of balance of power to denote the power relationships in the European state system from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War I. In this system, Great Britain played the role of "balancer" or" holder of the balance" as it was not identified with the policies of any European nation, but would rather back one side today and another tomorrow based on considerations of maintaining the balance. However, this changed drastically in the early 20th century and destroyed the European power structure that had existed since the end of the Middle Ages. According to this account:
Prior to the 20th century, the political world was composed of a number of separate and independent balance-of-power systems, such as the European, the American, the Chinese, and the Indian. But World War I and its attendant political alignments triggered a process that eventually culminated in the integration of most of world's nations into a single balance-of-power system. This integration began with the World War I alliance of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The integration continued in World War II....World War II ended with the major weights in the balance of power having shifted from the traditional players in Western and central Europe to just two non- ones: the result was a bi-polar balance of power across the northern half of the globe that pitted the free-market (800 democracies of the West against the communist one-party states of eastern Europe.
So while the Western European nations stayed with the NATO military alliance, the Soviet Union and its allies in central and Eastern Europe saw themselves in the Warsaw Pact under the leadership of Soviet Union.
Characteristics of Balance Of Power
Over the years, there have been some apparent features of balance of power. These features which we treat as the characteristics are:
First, the term balance of power suggests equilibrium, but it is very apparent that instead of equilibrium, disequilibrium seems to be the main feature of international politics.
Second, balance of power in practice tends to be temporary and unstable.
Third, balance of power doesn't just happen. It is rather a product of man's hard work through diplomatic contrivance.
Fourth, though balance of power tends to favour the status-quo, it must be dynamic for it to last.
Fifth, determining when it exists is through war, which in itself upsets the balance, which the policy is supposed to safe-guard.
Sixth, balance of power offers both an objective and subjective approach. Thus while historians believe a balance has been achieved when the opposing groups are equal in power, the statesman sees a balance only when his side is stronger.
Seventh, while the balance may have been a factor in the preservation of peace, it more or less leads to increased tensions among nations, arms build-up and wars.
Eight, the balance of power is clearly a game for the great states. art of Ninth, the balance of power seems to be neither suitable for democracies nor for dictatorships. the tenth, balance of power may seem ineffective or outmoded in this era, but then it still remains a useful device for maintaining international stability (Ojo &Sesay2002).
The concept of balance of power dates back to the ancient world and is still relevant in today's international politics. The period 1648 to 1815 is regarded as the classical period of European balance of power. However,
International there are many factors which have made its existence and relevance possible. These factors according to Ojo and Sesay (2002) are: 1. There were a sufficiently large number of independent states that made alliance formation and dissolution possible; og
2. Power was diffused among a substantial number of major states whose power was relatively equal;
3. Military power considerations outweighed ideological considerations; constituting binational to power were of relatively simple, reasonably calculable, and were stable enough to serve for some period of time as the basis of policy;
5. There was a notable absence of super-national institutions, which were capable of determining the policies of states;
6. Military technology was relatively not very advanced. It inhibited quick be mobilization for war and prevented prolonged wars. As such, war was an imaginable and usable instrument of policy
7. There was a broad agreement among states that the objectives of war should be limited. The essential pluralism of the state was not questioned, 8. There was a major power, which was well placed to play the role of 'balancer' of the system. The balancer was not permanently identified with the policies of one or a group of nations, and its principal objective was the maintenance of the balance. Consequently, the balancer often threw its weight behind the weaker combination of states to restore equilibrium. It has no permanent enemies. What was permanent, however, was the interest to maintain the system. This was the role that England played during this period. Sir Eyre Crowe in 1907 described this role thus "it has become almost an historic truism to identify England's secular power with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship de of the strongest single state or group at a given time";
9. There were political and cultural affinities among the European states which fostered respect for the rules of the game; and 10. Diplomacy, which was conducted in secrecy, was a prerogative of skilled bezk diplomats who were "largely free to engage in discretionary manoeuvres, manipulate alignments and adjust policy to the challenges opportunities with secrecy, and dispatch".
Jain (2020), identifies the following as the major postulates of balance of power: 29 212ed b
1) A nation following balance of power is prepared to change its alliances or treaties if the circumstances may so demand.
2) When a nation finds that a particular preponderance of power is increasing menacingly, it gets prepared to go to war for maintaining the balance. 3) Balance of Power postulates that no nation is to be totally eliminated in war. War is aimed only at the weakening of the power of the violafor of the balance. After war a new balance of power is attained. Balance of Power operates on the premise that excessive power anywhere in the system is a threat to the existence of others and that the most effective antidote to power is power.
One important point which Goldstein and Pevehouse (2009), have tried to point out is that "states do not always balance against the stronger actor. Sometimes smaller states "jump on the bandwagon" of the most powerful states; this has been called bandwargoning as opposed to balancing" (p.52). They gave an example of what happened after World War II, where a broad coalition did not form to contain U.S. power; rather major states joined the U.S. bloc.
Techniques of Balance of Power
Through the practice of balance of power over the centuries, some standard methods or devices have developed. These are mainly ones that have been used in the past with some degree of successes. They include: Undermining the strength of the enemy, Alliances and Counter Alliances, Armament and Disarmament, Compensations, Intervention and Non intervention, Divide and Rule and Buffer States.
a. Undermining the Strength of the Enemy
There is no doubt that internal peace and stability make a nation strong and in a better position to face the challenges posed by her neighbours. This realization is not lost on nations, hence the resort to different methods by nations to weaken their opponents internally. By inciting separatist movements, dissidents and opposition groups in another nation, it leaves it disorganized and weak and less capable of squaring up to its external opponents.
b. Alliances and Counter-Alliances
In international politics, argues Holsti (1995), the most common strategy for reducing vulnerabilities or diminishing threats is to augment military power, not just by building up one's own capabilities, but by enlisting the aid of others. He also posits that as both experimental and historical studies have shown, mutual fear is the most solid basis upon which to organize an alliance. Palmer & Perkins (1985) see alliances and counter alliances as the most commonly employed devices of the balance of power system. They see alliances as been of two kinds'- offensive and defensive.
Both of them are concerned with the balance of power. While an offensive alliance seeks to upset the balance in favour of its members, a defensive alliance aims at restoring this balance or tipping it in favour of the states that make up the alliance. The two main prerequisite of an effective alliance is, having enough power to achieve the purpose for which it was formed and having a common fundamental interest between or among the alliance partners.
C. Armaments and Disarmament
"Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim" (Morgenthau 1966). Though there are many elements of power, military strength is often the most dreaded of these elements. This explains why all nations that want to earn the respect and may be fear of their neighbours are involved in arms build-up. Incidentally, the action of a state in this regard, does not escape the close attention of other states. This explains the reason behind the arms race. Once a nation within a region increases its arms build-up, it destroys the balance of power within that region, tilting it to its favour. Other competing states out of fear, would also like to increase their own build-up so as to restore the balance. Thus, the arms-race especially as it involves weapons of mass destruction threaten human existence on a global scale and as such has led to attempts at reductions or Disarmament. Though these attempts have not been very successful, they surely show the concern by major powers to maintain the balance of power, which in any case is in their favour.
d. Compensations
The concept of compensations was a very common practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was believed that the acquisition of additional territories would enhance the power of a state and further weaken the state from which the territory is taken. Examples of compensations include the Treaty of San Stefano at the Congress of Berlin, the division of the colonial possessions of the defeated powers after both World War I and World War II. The Berlin conference of 1884/1885, where Africa was partitioned among European powers was based on the principle of compensations. e. Interventions and Non-interventions
The choice that a country makes, either to intervene in a dispute/war or not, has a lot of implications for the balance of power, and may even be said to some extent derive from it. Major powers who play the balancer employ this technique a lot, because either way it determines the outcome of the conflict. Thus, the intervention of a major power in a conflict may likely tilt the balance in favour of the side it joins, while its nonintervention may make a difference in who wins and ultimately the balance of power. The point being made above, is that the policy of intervention / nonintervention is based on either maintaining the balance or changing it. It must however be pointed out that this policy is mainly important as it related to great powers who can make a difference in a conflict. For most weak or newly independent states, they most times adopt the doctrine of neutrality, which is better known as non-alignment.
Divide and Rule
This is a policy that has been used by states to weaken the power of their opponents. This policy derives from the time tested saying that a house divided against itself cannot stand. So a state can decide to sponsor splinter or secessionist movements in their opponent's states so as to keep them busy struggling to keep their house in order, and therefore have less time for getting involved in international issues. Moreover, when a country is fighting internal insurrection, its armed forces would be distracted as they already have their hands full. In this type of situation, there would even be lack of trust among the armed forces as the insurrection would have created an atmosphere of distrust among the armed forces who may no longer be seeing themselves as one but as different tribes or ethnic groups. Without doubt, this situation would weaken the country involved to the benefit of their opponents.
Buffer States
forun Buffer states or zones are states that separate the great rival powers. The role of buffer states become appreciable if one imagined what would have happened at the height of the cold war, if the U.S and the Soviet Union are not geographically separated by land and ocean. Though these buffer states may be allies of the rival powers, the fact remains that "this is an area of weak states, vast distances, formidable geographic barriers, rising nationalisms and conflicting interests among the great powers" (Palmer & Perkins 1995, p.227). The impact of buffer states in the balance of power is quite tremendous.
Balance Of Power: An Evaluation
There is no doubt that the concept of balance of power, is quite a very important one in international politics. Many have in the past, considered it an indispensable tool for world peace. Thus Quincy wright (1942) has argued that "while other factors have had an influence, the concept of the balance of power provides the most general explanation for the oscillations of peace and war in Europe since the thirty year war".
The balance of power to Holsti (1985), is a mechanism by which states collaborate to maintain their independence against threats by those who seek hegemony or the creation of a world empire He goes ahead to give examples of how the concept has been used in the past to checkmate the dominance of the system by powerful states thus:
In the 1700's, the states of Europe collaborated in a war against Louis XIV, who was commonly thought to have extensive overseas empires. Similarly, in 1813 the states of Europe formed the grand coalition that defeated Napoleon, whose plans were to replace the states system with a Paris-centered empire. And again in 1939, the free states of Europe, plus the common countries and the United States, joined forces to defeat Hitler's great project for a "Thousand-Year Reich" that would form the center of a German dominated "New Order". These were all examples of the balance of power in operation. The balance of power is not intended to prevent war, its purpose is to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of states the society of states- that are threatened by those who wish to destroy the states system and put some other form of centralized, imperial control in its place.
While not doubting the capacity of the balance of power to prevent war, one is also aware that it has equally failed in preventing some other wars too. Thus, it couldn't prevent the First World War, neither could it prevent the second.
Another major problem with the concept is the issue of measuring the power of nations, so as to achieve equilibrium or balance. This is near impossible. Beyond military strength, there are other elements of national power like geography, national resources, population and technology. In their evaluation of the concept, Ojo& Sesay (2002) argue that, the claim that it also helped to preserve the independence of states:
has also no universal application, it did not prevent the partition of Poland in the eighteenth century. Nor did it prevent Italy from occupying Ethiopia, or Japan from annexing a large part of China's territory in the 1930's. Its basic preposition that the acquisition of military power enhances the prospects of avoiding war cannot be sustained by historical experience. It leads to an acceptance of the arms race and the drive of nations to achieve military superiority that cannot enhance peace, rather it breeds the seeds of conflicts. President Woodrow Wilson went as far as to attribute the cause of World War-one itself to the system, which he described as an "arrangement of power, suspicion and dread" "which made settled peace impossible".
He argued that the system "has been tried and found wanting, for the best of all reasons, that it does not stay balanced inside itself and a weight which does not hold together cannot constitute make weight in the affairs of men.
The concept also assumes too much rationality in state behaviour. States would act in their own interests by automatically forming alliances to frustrate the imperialist ambitions of their rivals. When war is resorted to, the combatants would know when and where to stop so as not to permanently disrupt an equilibrium whose restoration is the object of their fighting. Their aim should always be the restoration of the status quo ante Belgium and not the destruction of their adversaries. However, it is generally incontestable that even in the 'golden age' of the balance of power system in Europe, the restraints on the incidence and extent of war were due to the technological, cultural and geographical conditions than restraints of foreign policy. It, for instance, ignores a whole range of other types of power in diplomacy-political, economic, psychological-and military. Even then it is based on the premise that the relative power of states can easily be measured and compared. It is, only by measuring and comparing the relative power of states in the system that one can know whether equilibrium is being disrupted or not.
To measure the components of a single nation's power is difficult in itself. But balance of power relies on the near accurate measurement of the power of every state in the system and the correlation of one with the other.
Moreover, the idea that relative strength leads to peace is, at best, dubious. The uncertainly as to the reliability of a state's calculation of the distribution of power within the system invariably leads states to strive for superior strength on the assumption that the resultant superior strength would deter aggression by the weaker state or group of states. But as David Singer and Melvin Small have shown, a relative superiority may actually invite attack. In five out of nine wars involving great powers between 1815 and the mid- 1950s, the states that were attacked were appreciably militarily stronger than the aggressors. It is possible that the growth of a states military strength may so terrify its enemies that the latter may consider making a pre-emptive strike. The events leading to the outbreak of World War I is a classic sample.
Although Austria knew that the power of Russia was on the increase, it made a preemptive attack on her in order to change the distribution of power in the Balkans in its favour. The Israeli pre-emptive strike at the Egyptian air force i June 1967 is a more contemporary example.
In conclusion, despite the unipolar world and the rise of new centers of economic power, there is still no doubt that the concept of balance of power is still relevant in world politics, though in a changed colouration.
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